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FOREWORD: WHAT’S SO WICKED ABOUT 
LOCHNER? 
Randy E. Barnett* 
I am honored to have been invited to provide some opening remarks to this 
fascinating symposium on Lochner v. New York,1 the case that, like the Wicked Witch 
of the West, so many law professors love to hate. The articles in this issue are far 
too diverse to provide the basis of a coherent comment, so I shall not attempt to do 
so. Instead, I will offer my own brief analysis of Lochner and what I think was really 
wrong with this much reviled opinion from the perspective of the original meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Alleged Wickedness of Lochner 
When I was a student in constitutional law, I became disillusioned with the 
Constitution.2 It seemed that each time we came to one of the good parts that lim-
ited government powers—such as the Commerce Clause, Necessary and Proper 
Clause, and Tenth Amendment—or protected liberty—such as the Ninth Amend-
ment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth—we would read 
how the Supreme Court had interpreted them to eliminate any barriers they might 
have posed.3 Supreme Court opinions that limited federal or state powers were few 
and far between.  
Then we came to Lochner v. New York. Compared with previous cases, this 
one seemed to be in a completely different spirit. Absent was the usual effort to 
twist the meaning of the text to justify some claim of governmental power. Instead, 
Lochner exemplified a refreshing judicial skepticism about legislative rationales of-
* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law. <rbarnett@bu.edu> Permission to re-
print for classroom use is hereby granted. 
1 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
2 Elsewhere I have told the story of how, after this initial disillusionment, I regained my interest in the 
Constitution again. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY ix-xiv (2004). 
3 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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fered by the state. That Lochner was different was also evidenced by the whining 
dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes—with its cheap shot reference to “Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics.”4 “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Dr. John 
Locke’s Two Treatises of Government” or “Justice Thomas Cooley’s treatise on the 
police power of states” would not have packed quite the same rhetorical impact.5 
The casebook we used was the ninth edition of Gerald Gunther’s Constitu-
tional Law.6 Immediately following the case was a section entitled, “The Discredited 
Period of Judicial Intervention: What Was Wrong with Lochner?”7 This section 
made clear that, unlike McCulloch, Gibbons, and Slaughter-House, the Lochner deci-
sion was not held in high esteem. Professor Gunther made clear that “the modern 
Court has repeatedly insisted that it has turned its back on the evils of the Lochner 
philosophy.”8 But he then went on to ask a series of questions that signaled an un-
certainty about why Lochner was really so wicked: 
What were those evils? The giving of substantive content to due process? 
The expansive view of “liberty” and “property” to include values not spe-
cifically stated in the Constitution? The selection of the “wrong” funda-
mental values for special judicial protection? The failure to state general 
standards? The inadequacy of the articulated standards? The failure to ap-
ply the standards with adequate receptiveness to factual date? The failure 
to apply the general standards with adequate receptiveness to the society’s 
hierarchy of values? The failure to apply the general standards with ade-
quate consistency and neutrality? Excessive preoccupation with the per-
missibility of legislative ends? Excessive preoccupation with the “reason-
ableness” of legislative means—the extent to which the means contributed 
to the achievement of permissible ends?9 
Before offering some possible answers to these questions, Professor Gunther noted 
that “the modern Court has not drawn from Lochner the lesson that all judicial in-
tervention via substantive due process is improper. Rather, it has withdrawn from 
careful scrutiny in most economic areas but has maintained and increased interven-
tion with respect to a variety of non-economic personal interests.”10 
Later in the chapter came a section entitled “The Revival of Substantive 
Due Process, for Noneconomic Rights: Privacy and Autonomy,” which started with 
a discussion of the still-respected Lochner-era cases of Meyer v. Nebraska11 and Pierce 
4 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
5 See also Barnett, supra note 2, at 214-16 (discussing invocation of Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics in 
Thirty-Ninth Congress). 
6 GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 1975). 
7 Id. at 564. 
8 Id. at 565 (emphasis added). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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v. Society of Sisters.12 This was immediately followed by Griswold v. Connecticut13 and 
Roe v. Wade.14 When I reviewed the casebook to write this Foreward, I was sur-
prised to see that as many as fifty pages separated Lochner and Griswold,15 since as a 
student the message of the casebook was clear: If Griswold and Roe were today 
thought to be good cases, then Lochner could no longer be dismissed as “evil.” 
Twelve years later, in one of my earliest articles on the Constitution, I wrote 
that: 
Beginning in the 1970s, when the doctrine of substantive due process was 
rehabilitated by such writers as Gerald Gunther and Lawrence Tribe, the 
positions of those on the left and those on the right had reversed. Modern 
liberals now use substantive due process and the language of “entitle-
ment” to protect certain basic personal (as opposed to economic) liberties 
and to defend the welfare and regulatory state from the powerful intellec-
tual (and popular) assault that classical liberals and conservatives have 
developed in recent years.16 
As evidence for Professor’s Gunther’s contribution to this “rehabilitation,” I cited 
his casebook.17 
Soon after the article appeared, I received a short note from Professor Gun-
ther expressing his dismay at my suggestion that he had anything to do with the 
rise of “substantive due process.” To the contrary, he said he paired Lochner with 
Griswold and Roe not to boost the legitimacy of Lochner, but to undermine Griswold 
and Roe! He was appalled by the thought that his casebook might have had the op-
posite effect.18 Yet, given that his was the predominant constitutional law casebook 
in those days, I do believe it had this opposite, unintended effect on many. 
Since the Seventies, however, it has been harder for today’s political pro-
gressives to inveigh against the evils of Lochner while defending the use of substan-
tive due process to protect “personal” liberties. Lochner may have been wrongly 
decided on the facts, and perhaps also in protecting the liberty of contract as fun-
damental, but they can hardly claim, as their progressive forbears had done, that 
12 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
13 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
14 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
15 There is an intervening section entitled, “The Modern Era: The Decline—and Disappearance?—of 
Judicial Scrutiny of Economic Regulation.” GUNTHER, supra note 6, at 576-616. 
16 Randy E. Barnett, Are Enumerated Constitutional Rights the Only Rights We Have? The Case of Associational 
Freedom, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 106 (1987) (citations omitted). Writing this article for the Fifth 
Annual National Student Symposium of the Federalist Society, the punch line of which was the Ninth 
Amendment (see id. at 110), is what initially rekindled my interest in the Constitution. See id. at 112 n.46 
(“The proper meaning and use of the Ninth Amendment is a topic that merits further discussion.”). 
17 See id. at 106 n.21. 
18 I wish I could find the note so I could report his exact words and nuance, but alas I have had no luck. I 
am forced to rely on my eighteen-year-old recollection. 
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the Lochner court was engaging in “judicial activism” by using the Due Process 
Clause to protect a fundamental liberty from state infringement.19  
The honor of completely rejecting Lochner has fallen to today’s judicial con-
servatives. Although not all political conservatives are judicial conservatives, it is 
ironic that those who are can be described as unreconstructed Roosevelt New Deal-
ers in their judicial philosophy. For them only a “specific prohibition” in the Consti-
tution can rebut the presumption of constitutionality. In short, they adhere strictly 
to the original meaning of Footnote Four of the 1938 case, U.S. v. Carolene Products, 
which begins: 
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of consti-
tutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohi-
bition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which 
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Four-
teenth.20 
But notice that even today’s Rooseveltian judicial conservatives who hew to Foot-
note Four allow for the protection of the specific prohibitions provided by the enu-
merated rights. While some may grumble about the historical bona fides of “the in-
corporation doctrine,” by which selected portions of the Bill of Rights are applied to 
the states, few advocate rejecting “incorporation” and entirely abandoning all judi-
cial review of state legislation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Certainly no current Justice takes such a stance, and so some use of 
“substantive due process” survives even among judicial conservatives.21 
In contrast, while some political progressives may be returning to their ju-
dicial conservative heritage,22 those who stick with Roe and Griswold could be called 
“reconstructed” Roosevelt New Deal jurisprudes. They adopt the current approach 
of the Supreme Court: allow courts to enforce the express prohibitions of the Con-
stitution plus judicially-selected “fundamental” unenumerated rights that are 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” or “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”23 I call this “Footnote Four-Plus.” 
So if “substantive due process” is not inherently wrong, what, if anything, 
was wrong with Lochner? Its recognition of liberty of contract as a fundamental 
19 But see PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK BALKIN & AKHIL AMAR, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 337 (4th ed. 2000) (describing era in which Lochner was de-
cided, 1890-1934, as “the heyday of judicial activism”). 
20 United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added). 
21 Below I explain how and why this stance is mistaken. 
22 See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); 
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
23 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (“[T]he Due Process Clause specially protects those 
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion,’ . . . and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist 
if they were sacrificed . . . .’”) (internal citations omitted). 
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right? It is doubtful that the Court was using the current conception of “fundamen-
tal rights,” which can only be overcome by demonstrating a “compelling state in-
terest.” As evidenced by other cases before and after Lochner—indeed by the fact 
that the constitutionality of the rest of the Bakeshop Act was not even challenged—
the burden placed on the government was simply not that severe. As was noted 
even by Justice Holmes in his dissent, the Court had previously upheld many regu-
lations of and restrictions on freedom of contract.24  
Still, the Court did find that freedom of contract was the rule or baseline 
against which deviations needed to be justified. Holmes’ use of previous exceptions 
to argue against the existence of a general rule fails to acknowledge the exceptional 
status of “exceptions.” His move highlights the danger of making exceptions in a 
legal system that tends to view exceptions on Monday as precedents to be extended 
on Wednesday. Most importantly, as I have explained elsewhere, privileging some 
of the natural liberty rights retained by the people—either just the enumerated ones 
under Footnote Four or those plus some additional privileged unenumerated rights 
under Footnote Four-Plus—violates the equal protection of rights mandated by the 
Ninth Amendment that reads: “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain 
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the People.”25 
And, as I shall briefly explain, it would also violate the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
From Slaughterhouses to Bakeshops: 
The Real Problem with Lochner 
Lochner is indeed problematic because it violates the original meaning of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But ironically it does so in 
such a way that helps restore the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as a whole. To understand this, consider the structure of section one of the Four-
teenth Amendment (with a few key terms highlighted): 
[1] All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.  
[2] No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States;  
[3] nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law;  
[4] nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
24 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. IX; see Barnett, supra note 2, at 224-52. 
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These four provisions can be viewed as operating as a coherent unit. Doing so re-
solves a number of interpretive conundrums. Why did the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause apply to “citizens,” while the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses ap-
plied to “persons”? How is it that privileges or immunities shall not be abridged, 
but “any person” can be deprived of the most fundamental rights of life, liberty, 
and property provided “due process” is observed? Does the fact that the “equal 
protection of the laws” applies to any “person” mean that statutes can make no dis-
tinction in treatment between citizens and non-citizens? 
[1] The first sentence grants citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in 
the United States. That the scope of this sentence, and the rest of section one, was 
not limited to the newly freed slaves is evidenced textually both by its reference to 
“all persons” and also by its reference to those persons who are naturalized citi-
zens. 
[2] The Privileges or Immunities Clause, therefore, protects all “citizens,” 
whether white or black, born or naturalized in the United States. Over the past fif-
teen years, legal scholars have come to acknowledge that “privileges or immuni-
ties” was a reference both to natural rights and also to positive rights of citizenship 
established by the government, such as the right to trial by jury in the Fifth 
Amendment.26 The Privileges or Immunities Clause was written as it was to protect 
citizens as defined in the first sentence, which included former slaves born in the 
United States and also white southern Republicans. And citizens have privileges in 
addition to the natural rights they have as persons.  
As important for grasping the coherence of section one, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause applies to “law[s].” A law can violate the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause in two ways: first, because it deprives some citizens of the privileges or 
immunities enjoyed by others; second, because it abridges the privileges or immu-
nities of all citizens equally. In other words, the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
protects against both discriminatory laws and laws that deprive all citizens of their 
rights. Laws that do either are not proper exercises of the police power of states.27 
[3] The Due Process Clause applies to the “process” of applying laws to par-
ticular “persons.” It governs any state action that, pursuant to a law that satisfies the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, deprives any person of life, liberty or property. 
There are three possible ways that a state can use its police power to sanction be-
havior that violates a proper law: it can punish a person by death (“life”), by im-
prisonment (“liberty”), or by fine or confiscation (“property”). The Due Process 
Clause, then, governs how proper laws are to be applied to any particular person, 
26 The path-breaking work on this issue was done by Michael Kent Curtis in his greatly influential book, 
NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986). I add addi-
tional historical evidence in support of his thesis in BARNETT, supra note 2, at 60-68. 
27 For a discussion of how the extratextual “police power” of states should be construed in light of the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, see BARNETT, supra note 2, at 319-34. 
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citizen or not. A proper law can discriminate between a citizen and a non-citizen 
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but no person may be executed, impris-
oned, or fined without due process. 
[4] The Equal Protection Clause concerns the equal protection of otherwise 
proper laws.28 A law can be perfectly fine under the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, but still receive unequal protection by law enforcement. For example, while 
there may be a nondiscriminatory law against murder on the books, law enforce-
ment could look the other way when some are lynched by others. The problem here 
would not be with the law itself, or with the process of applying laws to particular 
persons, but with the fact that some persons are not receiving the equal protection 
of a law against murder. 
At the risk of oversimplification, another way to characterize the distinct 
functions of each of the three clauses is this: The Privileges or Immunities Clause is 
aimed mainly at the legislative branch of state governments and enjoins them from 
making certain laws (but it also enjoins the enforcement of improper laws too). The 
Due Process Clause is aimed mainly at the judicial branch of state governments and 
enjoins them from sanctioning the violation of otherwise proper laws without fol-
lowing procedures that ensure accurate outcomes (but it would apply to “adminis-
trative” procedures as well). And the Equal Protection Clause is aimed mainly at 
the executive branch of state governments and mandates that protection of proper 
laws be provided equally to all persons. 
Ever since The Slaughter-House Cases were decided in 1873, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause has been effectively redacted from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.29 Not too long afterwards, the Due Process Clause was expanded beyond the 
procedures by which laws are applied to persons and became applicable to the laws 
themselves. Enter the so-called “substantive due process” of statutes. This expan-
sion of “due process” is not as textually unwarranted as it is sometimes made to 
appear. If the “due process of law” includes judicial review to ensure that a law 
being applied to a particular person was within the proper constitutional power of 
the legislature to enact, then scrutinizing the substance of statutes is a part of the 
procedures that must be followed before a law may be enforced by death, impris-
onment, or fine.  
Nevertheless, the redaction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause wreaks 
havoc on the coherence and original meaning of Section 1. Using the Due Process 
Clause to textually justify the substantive scrutiny of laws distorts the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in at least five closely-related ways. (1) It 
shifts the substantive scrutiny of laws from the Privileges or Immunities Clause to 
28 See generally Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991). 
29 The sole exception to this generalization is Saenz v.Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
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the Due Process Clause; (2) because the Due Process Clause protects all persons, 
using it to scrutinize laws obscures the fact that a proper law may make distinctions 
between citizens and non-citizens; (3) it distorts the original meaning of “liberty” in 
the Due Process Clause by stretching its meaning beyond the matter of deprivation 
of liberty by imprisonment; (4) when “liberty” is expanded in this way, it is not 
clear how it fits with “property”; and (5) it limits the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to life, liberty, and property and not other positive rights or privileges 
of citizenship that may properly be denied to non-citizens but not to citizens. The 
most serious consequence of stretching the Due Process Clause beyond its original 
meaning to substantively scrutinize laws is how it undermines the legitimacy of 
this type of scrutiny. 
The same story can be told about the Equal Protection Clause. After Slaugh-
ter-House, the scrutiny of discriminatory laws was shifted to the Equal Protection 
Clause, which was originally concerned mainly with protection of otherwise proper 
nondiscriminatory laws. In contrast with substantive due process, few have pro-
tested this shift. Still, it distorts the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause 
in much the same way as the Due Process Clause and obscures the distinction be-
tween citizen and non-citizen acknowledged in the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause. 
As a result of The Slaughter-House Cases, then, the entire Fourteenth 
Amendment was distorted, as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses were 
stretched beyond their original meaning to restore a portion of the original mean-
ing of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Consequently, the use of the Due Proc-
ess Clause in this manner has been vulnerable to historical claims of illegitimacy 
from its inception during the Progressive Era until today. Not only has this shift in 
meaning undermined the legitimacy of protecting the rights of individuals from 
violation by state governments, it has also become a potent weapon against the 
practice of originalist constitutional interpretation. To the extent that distorting the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses in this way is thought to be morally de-
sirable, indeed essential, the moral imperative of this distortion provides a power-
ful argument against adhering to what is made to look like a morally inferior origi-
nal meaning. 
Moreover, the doctrine of substantive due process has only partially re-
stored the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole. The Privi-
leges or Immunities of citizens included, but was not limited to, the rights specified 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866: 
Such citizens of every race and color, without regard to any previous con-
dition of slavery . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory 
in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give 
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop-
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erty, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the secu-
rity of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.30 
Of course, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected these privileges or immunities 
only from discriminatory laws. But the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
not limited to discrimination. The content of the Civil Rights Act is significant be-
cause it identifies some of the privileges or immunities protected from abridgement 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. And these included the “right . . . to make and en-
force contracts”—the very right protected by the Court in Lochner v. New York. 
Conclusion 
The real problem with Lochner was not the protection it afforded to the lib-
erty of contract. Nor was it putting the burden on the states to justify the maximum 
hours law as a proper exercise of the police power. Nor did Lochner alter the consti-
tutional structure as amended by the Fourteenth Amendment. No, Lochner and the 
other Due Process Clause cases of the Progressive Era—and substantive due proc-
ess cases today—are all problematic because they continue to respect the precedent 
of the Slaughter-House Cases and refuse to restore the original meaning of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause.  
Were the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause revived, 
the text of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment would regain its original co-
herence. The federal protection of both enumerated and unenumerated rights 
against state governments would regain its legitimacy. And the advantages of ad-
hering to the original meaning of the Constitution—even where the Court and 
commentators think they have something better to put in its place—would be rein-
forced.  
We are not today preoccupied with the threats posed by slaughterhouses or 
bakeshops to the health of persons employed there or of the general public. Yet the 
cases involving slaughterhouses and bakeshops still pose a threat to the health of 
constitutional interpretation and the Constitution itself. But there is a cure: Reverse 
Slaughter-House and the “evils” of Lochner would simply melt away like the Wicked 
Witch of the West.31 
 
30 Act of April 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (emphasis added).  
31 But see GREGORY MAGUIRE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE WICKED WITCH OF THE WEST (2004) (providing 
backstory that explains why so-called Wicked Witch of the West was completely mischaracterized in 
Wizard of Oz and was really good). 
